463.7.1 Trusted Computing

Computer Security II
CS463/ECE424
University of Illinois
Security News of the Day

Most PCs that have shipped in the last 5 years are capable of running Trusted Platform Module version 2.0 (TPM 2.0). TPM 2.0 is required to run Windows 11, as an important building block for security-related features. TPM 2.0 is used in Windows 11 for a number of features, including Windows Hello for identity protection and BitLocker for data protection.

Windows 11 won’t stop older PCs, but it might make you sign this waiver

Microsoft reserves the right to deny updates

By Sean Hollister | @StarFire2258 | Sep 21, 2021, 3:34pm EDT
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
Secure Enclaves (SGX)
History of Tamper Resistance

• History of Tamper Resistance goes back centuries

• Examples:
  – Weight down **code books** on naval ships
  – The keys for wartime cipher machines have been printed in **water soluble ink**
  – IBM 3848 and the VISA security module (1980s)

**Motivation of Secure Hardware:**
Prevent **powerful** adversaries from getting secret (e.g., those that compromised OS)
Trusted Computing

• Trusted Computing is the term developed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
  – Founded in 1999 with a large number of companies

• Trusted Computing allows “a piece of data to dictate what Operating System and Application must be used to open it”
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

- Hardware module at heart of *hardware/software* approach to Trusted Computing

- Uses a TPM chip

- Has three basic services:
  - Encryption, certification, authenticated boot
TPM Functions

- Cryptographic co-processor
- HMAC engine
- SHA-1 engine
- Opt-In
- Non-volatile memory

I/O

- Key generation
- Random number generator
- Power detection
- Execution engine
- Volatile memory

Platform Configuration Registers (PCR)
Secure/Authenticated Boot Service

Boot Loader → OS Kernel → Kernel module

...
Secure/Authenticated Boot Service

• Q: How can we verify that our boot loader is not tampered?
Secure/Authenticated Boot Service

- A: Hashing!

\[ \text{SHA}(\text{Boot Loader}) \neq \text{SHA}(\text{Boot Loader}) \]
Secure/Authenticated Boot Service

- Q: How can we verify Boot Loader and OS Kernel are both not tampered?
Secure/Authenticated Boot Service

SHA (Boot Loader) || SHA (OS Kernel)
Secure/Authenticated Boot Service

Secure boot

SHA-1(in): **
if Dict[in] == null:
    Dict[in] = flip coins
return D[in]

** we wish

Can now verify secure boot w/ signed Quote(),
Unseal data

Figure: Intel SGX Explained; Victor Costan and Srini Devadas
Certification Service

- Once a configuration is achieved and logged, the TPM can certify configuration to others (attestation)

- Challenge value in certificate assures timeliness
  - Use a random number as the challenge when requesting a certificate from TPM

- Provides a hierarchical certification approach
Encryption Service

• Encrypts data so that it can only be decrypted by a machine with a certain configuration

• TPM maintains a master secret key unique to machine

• Can extend scheme upward
  – Extend the trust to OS, and then application
Example: Windows BitLocker Drive Encryption

- **Windows 10** uses TPM on multiple components including its **drive encryption**

- **BitLocker** relies on the TPM to allow the use of a key only when startup occurs in an **expected** way

- The hard drive remains confidential when:
  - Different OS booted from USB device
  - Hard disk is lost or stolen when powered off
Criticisms against TPM

The concept of Trusted Computing is developed and promoted by the Trusted Computing Group

- Root of trust
- Anti-competitive effect
463.7.1.2
Secure Enclaves

Based on Slides from
1. Intel SGX (Reference Number: 332680-002) presented at ISCA 2015
2. Intel’s SGX In-depth Architecture by Syed Kamran Haider with Hamza Omar, Masab Ahmad, Chenglu Jin, and Marten van Dijk

https://sgx101.gitbook.io/sgx101/sgx-bootstrap/enclave
Why Aren’t Compute Devices Trustworthy?

Protected Mode (rings) protects OS from apps...

App

X

OK

Privileged Code
Why Aren’t Compute Devices Trustworthy?

Protected Mode (rings) protects OS from apps...

App

\[ \text{X} \]

App

\[ \text{X} \]

\[ \text{X} \]

OK

Privileged Code

... and apps from each other ...
Why Aren’t Compute Devices Trustworthy?

Protected Mode (rings) protects OS from apps ...

App

X

Malicious App

X

Bad Code

Privileged Code

... and apps from each other ...

... UNTIL a malicious app exploits a flaw to gain full privileges and then tampers with the OS or other apps

Apps not protected from privileged code attacks
Why Aren’t Compute Devices Trustworthy?

Protected Mode (rings) protects OS from apps ...

... and apps from each other ...

... UNTIL a malicious app exploits a flaw to gain full privileges and then tampers with the OS or other apps

Apps not protected from privileged code attacks
Reduced Attack Surface with SGX

• Complexity of modern systems force programmers to inspect a large code base for vulnerability detections

• Application code
• OS code
• Virtual Machine Manager Code
Reduced attack surface with SGX

• Applications gain ability to defend their own secrets
  – Smallest attack surface (app + processor)
  – Malware that subverts OS/VMM, BIOS, Drivers etc, cannot steal app secrets
• Familiar development/debug
  – Single application environment
  – Build on existing ecosystem expertise
• Familiar deployment model
  – Platform integration not a bottleneck to deployment of trusted apps

Intel becomes the root of trust in this security model.
SGX: Software Guard Extensions

- Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
  - Built into Intel CPUs
  - The built-in CPU instructions allow user-level as well as OS code to define private regions of memory, called **enclaves**
  - Contents in enclaves are encrypted and unable to be either read or written by any process outside the enclave (including privileged processes).
SGX Overview

• Security perimeter is the CPU package boundary
• Data unencrypted inside the CPU package only
• Externally, memory reads and bus snooping attacks see only encrypted data

Isolation and Attestation

SGX enabled processors offer two crucial properties.

• **Isolation:** Each enclave’s environment is isolated from the untrusted software outside the enclave, as well as from other enclaves.

• **Attestation:** A software attestation scheme that allows a remote party to authenticate the software running inside an enclave.

We will focus on the isolation property for the remainder of the lecture.
How Secure Enclaves Work

- Application is built with **trusted** and **untrusted** parts
- **Trusted** and **untrusted** parts are explicitly separated by app developers
How Secure Enclaves Work

- App runs & creates enclave which is placed in trusted memory

- The memory region (enclave page cache, or EPC) is encrypted

- When processor fetches the data, it needs to decrypt it
How Secure Enclaves Work

- Trusted function (ECALL) is called
- Code running inside enclave sees data in clear
- External access to data is denied
How Secure Enclaves Work

- Function returns; enclave data **remains** in trusted memory
Enclaves and Objects

• An Enclave is like a class.
• It can maintain its own state like Objects do with private variables.
• ECALLs is like a method, and OCALL is like a return.
• Enclave’s property of isolation is like Object Oriented Programming’s principle of encapsulation.
Intel SGX SDK for Linux

• Intel provides a Software Development Kit (SDK) for C/C++ programmers:

“It is a collection of APIs, libraries, documentation, sample source code, and tools that allows developers to create and debug Intel SGX enabled applications.”
Disclaimer

• SGX allows a subset of C/C++ library functions to be used inside the Enclave
• List of allowed/disallowed library functions are defined at the Intel SGX Developer Reference

https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/linux-2.4/docs/Intel_SGX_Developer_Reference_Linux_2.4_Open_Source.pdf
Example: Hardening an Application with SGX

1. Identify Sensitive Data Objects and Code
Hardening an Application with SGX

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2. Use SGX Tools to create an Enclave Module (Shared Object)
Hardening an Application with SGX

1. Identify Sensitive Data Objects and Code
2. Use SGX Tools to create an Enclave Module (Shared Object)
3. Move Sensitive Data Objects and Code to the Enclave
   - Change only affects Application Modules which host sensitive data and code.
   - Application now consists of an Untrusted Component and a Trusted Component.
Hardening an Application with SGX

4. Identify Entry Points into Trusted Code
4. Identify Entry Points into Trusted Code
5. Use Tools to Create Glue Code

- Untrusted component can now call into trusted component (ECall)
Hardening an Application with SGX

6. Need an OS Call from the Enclave?
   • Use Tools to Create Glue Code for Enclave calls to the Application (OCall)

7. Use SGX Libraries in the Application and the Enclave
   • Call loader API to Load the Enclave
SGX Application Example

1. Create/Init Enclave
2. ECALL
3. Trusted function
4. OCALL
5. Untrusted function
6. Return
Limitations

SGX does not defend against software side-channel adversary!

**Software Side-Channel Adversary**: An adversary who can gather statistics from the CPU regarding execution and may be able to use them to deduce characteristics of the software being executed (side-channel analysis)

1. Gather power statistics
2. Gather performance statistics including platform cache misses
3. Gather branch statistics via timing
4. Gather information on pages accessed via page tables
Discussion Questions

• Should we accept Intel as a root of trust?

• What are some use cases for Trusted Computing in addition to disk encryption (e.g., Bitlocker)?